The quintessence of the supremacy of the constitution according to Dicey lies in the constitution (1) being written, (2) being rigid, and (3) providing for judicial review. This article examines the existence of these criteria in the constitution of Singapore. As relevant local case law is very limited, an effort is made to interpret the provisions of the constitution, mostly in the context of the experience inn the working of the pertinent provisions of the constitution of India and Malaysia, which are germane to the constitution of Singapore.

This article discusses the scope of the hearsay rule in the light of recent developments. Two issues raised in recent judgements - mechanically-generated evidence and statements of intention - are also analysed. Finally, the article discusses the implications of a trial system without juries on the rules of evidence, in particular, the hearsay rule.

This article considers the salient arguments of John Finnis, Philip Soper, Michael Detmold, and Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, all of whom published important works on jurisprudence in the 1980s. Their theories challenge the prevalent Legal Positivist assumption that law and morality are logically separate. Some argue that a connection exits between the two in the purpose of law; others in its procedural aspects. Drawing on the insights of Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant, amongst others, these writers have revived and redefined the hitherto moribund tradition of Natural Law theorising.

What is plain English? What are its advantages in commercial contracts? What are the objections to its use? Are those objections valid? How difficult is it to draft in Plain English? Whither Plain English?

This article considers the general tax avoidance provision contained in section 33 of the Singapore Income Tax Act in the context of similar provisions in other countries, particularly in Australasia (i.e. Australia and New Zealand). This article first looks at some of the terms in section 33, and at how they might be interpreted. It then considers, in the light of the Australian and New Zealand experience, some of the difficulties of producing definitive interpretations of provisions like section 33. finally, the application in Singapore of the doctrine of fiscal nullity is discussed. Its likely exclusion by the existence of section 33 is noted. Its possible application to some transactions involving dealings with countries with which Singapore has double tax agreements is also considered.