This article argues that the tort of lawful act conspiracy is best understood, not as an economic tort, but as an instance of abuse of rights, and why it requires a test of malice.

Securitisation, which involved shifting assets off balance sheets, inadvertently led to the creation of even greater risks that were packaged into toxic instruments that brought down a number of large financial institutions. In Singapore, however, the risks of the U.S. housing market collapse and consequent mortgage and financial institution default were largely moved out of the banking sector and sold to the public. In that sense, corporate/securities laws fulfilled the purpose of disintermediation. But while these insulated Singapore banks, the losses were largely borne by investors, whose confidence in the securities market has been eroded. The article discusses the legal and regulatory changes that have been made in response to the crisis, and suggests further trends and reforms dealing with its aftermath from financial and economic perspectives.

One of the fundamental aspects of the defence of contributory negligence is that it is objective in nature. Thus, when assessing the question of whether a claimant's failure to take care of his own safety contributed to the damage which he suffered, the court asks what a reasonable claimantwould have done in the relevant circumstances. The only universally accepted variation to this rule applies in the case of children, in relation to whom an age-appropriate albeit otherwise objective standard is imposed. Other categories of claimants are generally judged by purely objective criteria - even where, as in the case of those with physical or mental disabilities, such criteria may be wholly unrealistic.

In recent years, courts in the U.K. and Australia have decided a number of cases involving the concept of illegality,2 or ex turpi causa non oritur actio.3 Several of these cases have focused specifically on the branch of illegality relating to joint illegal enterprises. Although courts in both jurisdictions have always shown greater willingness to refuse claims which involve joint participants in criminal ventures than those which do not, the actual basis for the refusal of such claims has been uncertain - with some judges taking the view that the very nature of the enterprise negates the duty of care and others concentrating on whether it is impossible to establish an appropriate standard of care between joint wrongdoers. This uncertainty was resolved in Australia by the decision of the High Court in Miller v. Miller,4 which rejected as artificial the "impossibility of setting a standard of care" approach, and effectively reverted to an approach based on duty. Given that the High Court of Australia has always been something of a trail-blazer where the law on joint illegal enterprises is concerned, the case gave rise to understandable speculation about the possibility of courts in other jurisdictions following suit.

It has been the position for quite some time in English jurisprudence that an agreement to agree and an agreement to negotiate are invalid and unenforceable. This was the position established in Walford v. Miles2 and Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd. V. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd.3 The rationale for this was that such agreements were too uncertain to be enforceable. This is certainly true for an agreement to agree; one could not accurately predict whether an agreement is possible in every case especially when there may be structural constraints to the factual matrix that make an agreement impossible.

I first encountered Andrew Harding's work as a young law student when I became fascinated with Malaysian constitutional law. Harding's exegeses on public law and Islam (e.g., Andrew Harding, "Islam and Public Law in Malaysia: Some Reflections in the Aftermath of Susie Teoh's Case" (1991) 1 M.L.J. xci, and Andrew Harding, "The Keris, the Crescent and the Blind Goddess: The State, Islam and the Constitution in Malaysia" (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 154) shaped my early understanding of Malaysian constitutional law, state and religion. His Geertzian approach to law draws out the complexity and anomalies of the pluralistic, post-colonial, and democratising Malaysian state. This perceptive local knowledge pervades his latest book, The Constitution of Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis, where he surveys the past, scrutinises the present, and meditates on the future of Malaysian constitutional law. It is part of the Constitutional Systems of theWorld series, which provides a comprehensive range of introductory texts on the various constitutions in the world.

Corruption is a scourge that has been afflicting several countries, particularly in the developing world. It has impeded economic progress and adversely affected the basic human rights of citizens. Although the spotlight is usually focused on government officials in those countries who represent the “demand” side of corruption, their blameworthiness is equally shared by some multinational corporations ("MNCs") who represent the “supply” side of corruption by offering favours to public officials in order to successfully secure business transactions through the use of such influence. While a multitude of approaches is being adopted both internationally and by national governments to tackle corruption, the concept of corporate social responsibility ("CSR") is rapidly gaining ascendancy as an anti-corruption tool. CSR attempts to strike at the root of the problem by addressing the supply side, which in the developing-country context is represented by MNCs that are operating there.

I would like to start by congratulating all the speakers who have spoken yesterday and up to before the break. After listening to Professor Furmston's welcome address, the Minister's keynote speech defending robustly Singapore's practical conception of the 'rule of law', Professor Tamanaha's magisterial lecture, Professor Weiler's passionate defence of a 'rule of law' that must incorporate the values of democracy and human rights and the Attorney-General and Justice Rajah's moderation of the views of the experts on their respective panels, I have to say that the better part of the symposium is probably over, with apologies to the panellists and speakers coming later. So I will liven upmy lecture by referring to the 'rule of law'news in The Straits Times this morning.

I have written extensively about the rule of law for two basic reasons. First, the notion of the rule of law is perhaps the most powerful and often repeated political ideal in contemporary global discourse. Everyone, it seems, is for the rule of law. The rule of law is a major source of legitimation for governments in the modern world. A government that abides by the rule of law is seen as good and worthy of respect. In recent decades, billions of dollars have been spent by theWorld Bank and other development agencies on developing the rule of law around the world—with limited success.

'Legitimacy' is a notoriously elusive term, over-used and under-specified. So the first thing I will do is to explain the sense in which I plan to use 'legitimacy' in this essay. Do not, lease, argue with me and say: "That is not 'legitimacy'! It means something else!" This is how I plan to use it, and I hope to convince you that it is a useful way for articulating something terribly important about the present crisis and the current state of European integration.