Unauthorised access to data has raised concern amongst business, citizens and legislators globally. However, different jurisdictions have taken various approaches ranging from controlling access via data protection legislation to deeming liability based on the nature of the data, such as through privacy legislation. This paper is a comparative analysis of the privacy legislation of the Philippines, Thailand and Australia through their Data Privacy Act of 2012, the Personal Data Protection Act 2019, and the Privacy Act 1988, respectively. These Acts have many provisions, and Australian states also have their own acts. The Australian federal legislation is the most developed of the three and its effectiveness can be evaluated by outcomes of investigations and enforceable undertakings issued for data breaches. In all three countries, the primary data privacy legislation is also supported by privacy-related provisions under other statues. The analysis focuses on types of data protected by privacy provisions, methods for investigating breaches and imposing penalties, and whether breaches result in administrative action, civil liability or criminal offences.

In E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout Residence Pte Ltd (2010), the Singapore High Court declared that unconscionability as a vitiating factor in contract did not form part of the law of Singapore. That statement was the culmination of growing judicial doubts as to the status of the doctrine of unconscionability in Singapore. However, the signal decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in BOM v BOK (2018) arrested that development and charted a new course for the doctrine. This article examines the current state of the doctrine of unconscionability in Singapore. It traces the rise and fall of judicial scepticism towards unconscionability in Singapore and welcomes the clarity introduced by the restatement of the doctrine in BOM v BOK . It calls on the Singaporean courts to resist the temptation, manifested in BOM v BOK , to accept the view that the doctrine of unconscionability is redundant because its function is now performed by undue influence. The article argues that, contrary to the characterisation in BOM v BOK , the doctrine of unconscionability represented by the earlier English cases is a broad doctrine, not a narrow one. It also contends that it is misleading to suggest that the formulation of the doctrine in the current English cases is, in substance, the same as that of the 'broad' doctrine of unconscionability exemplified by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983). The paper scrutinises the reshaped doctrine of unconscionability formulated in BOM v BOK , highlights some potential difficulties in the three-step process of that doctrine and concludes with a call for a reconsideration of some aspects of the doctrine.

In recent decades, a number of fantastically successful, mainly American, multinational entities ("MNEs")—led and epitomised by the 'Four Horsemen', Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google, but also extending beyond the tech sector—have earned huge profits, while paying very low global taxes, through their use of intellectual property ("IP"). Since IP, in contrast to tangible property, generally lacks a clear location, it empowers corporate tax avoidance at the expense of both the production countries where the MNEs' high-value owner-employees live, and the market countries where their customers live. This two-part article assesses the challenges posed for countries' international tax systems by the rise of mobile IP, including but not limited to the case where it is embodied in a digital platform. Part One assessed the challenges posed for the traditional income tax concept of source, and for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")'s proposed focus on the site of 'value creation'. In this issue, Part Two focuses on proposals to shift taxing rights towards market jurisdictions that may enjoy location-specific rents with regard to the MNEs' access to their consumers, including via the use of digital service taxes ("DSTs").

The double actionability rule, which was first laid down in the 19th century, has been the subject of considerable academic and judicial criticism. Over the years, several jurisdictions around the world have abandoned the double actionability rule in favour of alternative choice of law rules for torts. Canada, in two landmark decisions, reconsidered its earlier jurisprudence on the applicable choice of law rules for torts, as well as multijurisdictional defamation cases in particular. However, the apex court in Singapore has unquestioningly adopted the double actionability rule as part of Singapore law in a series of cases starting in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the seeds of reform that were sown by the lower courts at various points in time have been largely ignored. This article argues that in the light of recent developments and changing circumstances, the time is now ripe for Singapore to follow the lead of Canada and many other jurisdictions in departing from the double actionability rule.

Singapore's courts have long refused to adopt proportionality review in constitutional adjudication. However, their instinct to reject proportionality, while possibly well-founded, has yet to be thoroughly tested. This article forwards three arguments for proportionality's use in Singaporean constitutional adjudication. First, as a matter of precedent, proportionality's four enquiries are already latent in Singapore's constitutional jurisprudence. Second, as a matter of principle, Singapore's courts have the constitutional authority to adopt proportionality as a ground of constitutional review and are not institutionally incompetent to answer its enquiries. Third, on grounds of policy, proportionality is desirable because it helps ensure the cogency and rationality of legislative or executive acts within Singapore's burgeoning political culture of justification. By making a case for proportionality in precedent, principle and policy, this article hopes to initiate a considered discussion on whether and, if so, to what extent proportionality should be used in Singaporean constitutional adjudication.

Vicarious liability claims have often stirred controversy, as liability is being imposed on a party which is not responsible for the tortious conduct. This is especially so, as the law on vicarious liability has been expanding over the past few years to include an increasing scope of relationships and circumstances. This case comment looks at two decisions of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2020 which took a step back from this expansionary approach and introduces new constraints. In examining the desirability of these changes and comparing them with the position in Singapore, it is hoped that new perspectives will be gained to clarify this unsettled area of the law.

Wee Teng Yau represents the first case on tax avoidance by professionals to come before the Supreme Court. This note attempts to reconcile the judgments of the High Court and the Income Tax Board of Review, which both made findings that the taxpayer had engaged in tax avoidance, but which approached the case rather differently on some points. Apart from a clear rejection of the "personal exertion" principle as having no legal basis under Singapore law, it appears that the common conclusion is that professionals incorporating a company would not constitute tax avoidance in itself, but if this was coupled with the paying of an artificially low level of remuneration to the same practicing professional, this might well constitute tax avoidance.

Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Public Prosecutor is potentially the most important constitutional decision ever rendered by the Singapore Court of Appeal, insofar as it heralds a new and more intrusive approach to the judicial review of rights claims in Singapore. The ruling expressly overturned deference postures associated with the "presumption of constitutionality," at least with respect to Article 14 of the Constitution; it consolidated dicta announcing the reconfiguration of separation of powers doctrines; and it developed and deployed a rudimentary, if yet incomplete, form of proportionality review to assess the legality of legislation adopted under Article 14's limitation clause. The note analyses these changes from a comparative perspective, in light of the difficulties foreign apex courts have had in fully transitioning to a more balancing-friendly approach to rights adjudication.

The promise of international arbitration as an efficient dispute resolution mechanism has been plagued by the unsavoury practice of parties abusing their due process rights to attack arbitral awards that turn out unfavourably. The Court of Appeal in CMNC v Jaguar Energy sends a clear message that parties themselves must be accountable for raising their procedural objections contemporaneously to the tribunal, rather than reserving them for a second bite at the proverbial cherry.

The enforcement of foreign gambling debts and related foreign judgments has long troubled Singapore law. Although courts generally agree that their enforcement through the common law conflict of laws rules should be refused, the legal doctrines and concepts they invoke to justify that conclusion—procedural characterisations, forum mandatory rules and public policy—are unsuited for that purpose. This note argues that the use of those doctrines and concepts sits at odds with their underlying purposes as well as a principled understanding of the broader relationship between common law, statute and policy in private disputes with foreign elements. A prohibition on the enforcement of foreign gambling debts, if desired, should therefore be secured through legislative tools rather than the continued contortion of existing common law rules.