The development of public law is seldom regarded as a sine qua non for development. This is especially so in Asia where power and authority are viewed with respect rather than with suspicion, unlike in the west. This is ironic since Asian states have traditionally been very strong, and their roles have expanded greatly over the last forty years. Government intervention in the economy is now a given, and in many states, large bureaucracies, government agencies and government-linked companies have emerged. The expansion of the public sector calls for a legal framework of controls. If public law is to fulfill its function to check on the abuse or arbitrary exercise of executive power, it must grapple with three challenges: (a) Asian legal culture; (b) the need for governments to govern, seek legitimacy and maintain stability; and (c) extensive state intervention in the economy.

In common law jurisdictions, the trust is one of the most popular legal institutions for wealth management. Most civil law jurisdictions, however, have yet to embrace it. Debates continue as to the nature of the trust and its compatibility with indigenous legal concepts in civil law. The enactment of a domestic trust statute in China in 2001, and in major civil law jurisdictions in Asia (such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea) have demonstrated the practical importance of such debates in shaping trust legislation. Accordingly, this article seeks to take stock of the Asian approaches in receiving the trust, in the hope that insights can be drawn for the benefit of jurisdictions beyond Asia. The article first considers what the core features of the common law trust might be. Then, it looks at how these four jurisdictions adopt them, if not all, in their trust statutes and evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of the respective approaches.

The sangam (confluence) of foreign investment, multinational corporations (MNCs) and human rights raises new challenges for the developing countries in Asia. Though development is the underlying current behind this sangam, there is a fundamental tension in how the three streams intermingle. For example, the trend of investment-driven development often compels developing countries to allure foreign investments by MNCs, even if it brings negative effects on human rights realisation and development of the majority. A "race to the bottom" for securing foreign investment amongst developing countries further reduces their bargaining position vis-à-vis MNCs. Taking India as an example of developing countries of Asia, this article explores the individual and collective strategies that developing countries could employ to exercise a control over the flow and direction of foreign investment. It argues that developing countries should realise their place in an interdependent world, be guided by an approach of "diversified integration", rely on human rights norms, and foster alliances with civil society organs in order to control the flow and direction of foreign investment.