Institutional efforts to deal with the terrorism threat are in essence a collective action challenge: How do societies prevent terrorist ideology from establishing and gaining traction within a community? Assuming a terrorist attack takes place, especially by "home-grown" terrorists, what can society do to cope with the aftermath? How can societies fortify themselves to come out resiliently against such forces that seek to divide and destroy? These questions perhaps mask the central questions and concerns surrounding surveillance and intelligence - not just what is collected and processed but also how this information is used - in many jurisdictions. Surveillance and intelligence are integral parts of the larger strategy employed to ensure that societies can come out on top of the collective action challenge posed by terrorism.

This article focuses on some problems arising from applying the product due diligence requirement of the suitability rule to complex financial products. The article draws several conclusions. First, the 'not unsuitable' test should be adopted to reduce legal uncertainty. Second, the comparative risk approach is a better choice in assessing the suitability of investment products. However, there must be further elaboration of the classification of product risk. Third, there must be a balance between risk and return to avoid risk mismatches in product design. Fourth, what have been termed minibonds raise the problem of documentation suitability. Though it is difficult to define suitable documentation, it may be worthwhile for regulators to establish some minimum standards that might have a great influence on product risk. Financial regulators may consider differentiating between financial products in assessing their suitability rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach.

In the past, a number of English authorities have suggested that unlawful interference with trade (now also known as "causing loss by unlawful means" is a "genus" tort that provides the rationale as well as framework for analysing various economic torts including intimidation and conspiracy by unlawful means. However, this view has been decidedly rejected by the House of Lords in OBG Ltd. v. Allan. The majority judges in that case restricted the tort to one that redresses only unjustified interferences with third-party liberty. Since it has a multi-party structure, it is conceptually distinct from cases where liability has been imposed for direct (two-party) interferences. On this view, two-party intimidation, unlawful means conspiracy and causing loss by unlawful means are separate torts despite their common reliance on an independent legal wrong. It also means that there is no single thread that runs through this "family" of economic torts. While the element of illegality is an essential and common constituent of these torts, it is not the sole element that justifies the tort. Rather, each tort is founded on the combination of a particular course of conduct with the requisite unlawfulness. Consequently (and more controversially), it is now no longer meaningful to identify a single conception of "unlawful means" that is applicable to all these torts. In each case, it is essential to ensure that the illegality constitutes the tort only if it produces the type of conduct that the tort is designed to deter.

In 2005, the archaic laws of sedition were summoned to counteract speech considered offensive to racial and religious groups in Singapore. Under the Sedition Act, it is seditious to, inter alia, promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population. In a later case involving religious proselytisation, a Christian couple was charged and convicted of sedition under the same section. This article examines this new phenomenon. It investigates the manner in which these laws have been employed and jurisprudentially developed to restrain speech on race and/or religion in Singapore. The article argues that the current state of the law is highly problematic for its adverse impact on free speech as well as for its conceptual confusions with alternative bases for restraining speech. It contends that failure to extricate the existing conceptual confusions is adverse to free speech and community integration in the long run. A threefold legal framework is proposed to provide clearer guidance on inter-racial and inter-religious interaction within the Singaporean society.

The right of 'communication to the public' was introduced into the Singapore Copyright Act in 2004, as part of its implementation of art. 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (the "WCT") 1996. The purpose of this right is clear enough: it is to allow right-holders to control, inter alia, the dissemination of their copyright works via the internet. There is a recent case in Singapore which involved an unauthorised transmission of copyright works via the internet. Yet the right-holder in this case lost in its claim for infringement of its right of 'communication to the public'. This defeat brings into focus the two essential elements of this right: namely, the two 'Whom's'. To whom is the communication made - is it to "the public"? By whom is the communication made - is it the defendant in the infringement action? This article suggests that the Singapore approach in answering these two questions is overly strict, and may be inconsistent with what the promulgators intended for the right of 'communication to the public'. This assessment is made in the light of the travaux pre'paratoires of the WCT, as well as developments in Australia and the EU.

Public bodies are endowed with far-reaching administrative powers to formulate and implement policy. Administrative law focuses upon the extent of these powers, the way in which they are exercised and controlled, and on the relationship between public bodies and those who are affected by decision-making. With the growth of executive power, judicial review has emerged as a necessary counterweight to assure accountability in the decision-making of government authorities. Against such a background, this article evaluates the contribution which judicial review has made to combating air pollution in Hong Kong to date. It essays a variety of reasons to do with Hong Kong's colonial past as to why judicial review has, in general, been a dilute force for accountability of administrators and especially so when a decision has environmental implications.

Much concern has been expressed over the problem of 'short-termism' as evidenced in the numerous discussion papers made public by industry and investor associations and regulatory bodies in the US and the UK. While concerns over short-termism and its effects are not new, the short-termism being experienced now is the result of structural changes brought about by agency theory based managerial compensation and its four legged strategy of short term managerial employment contracts, stock based compensation, high stock price, and the pursuit of high-risk high-return investment strategies to achieve the latter. This article investigates the changes to corporate governance structure that have produced short-termism, short-termism's present form and continuing hold, how it has impacted on corporate governance, and what, if anything, should be done about it.

Notwithstanding that s. 216 of the Singapore Companies Act, on a literal construction, extends the oppression remedy to debentureholders of a company, there have to date been no reported cases in Singapore involving any attempted use of the oppression remedy by debentureholders. This article first explores the origins of the references to 'debentureholders' in s. 216. This article then proceeds to examine the scope of the s. 216 remedy in a debentureholder context, and concludes by discussing a number of principles upon which a fairness analysis in a debentureholder context may be undertaken.

This article explores how defamation jurisprudence in Singapore has elevated the political public figure to an exalted position, virtually according the reputation of these honourable men, or junzi, heightened protection over the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. It takes the position that there are sufficient bases for the Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. privilege (the Reynolds privilege) to be adopted under Singapore common law, independent of any reliance on art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It further argues that courts in Singapore ought to draw on relevant English and Australian jurisprudence, and consider a broader qualified privilege defence in defamation suits involving political public figures. The author concludes that the common law of qualified privilege in Singapore should be reviewed to take into account a multi-factorial approach when examining whether greater leeway may be accorded to citizen comments on public officials and public policy that are relevant to good government and good governance.

The recent Court of Appeal decision in BNP Paribas v. Jurong Shipyard Pte Ltd is a landmark decision on the insolvency tests in s. 254 of the Companies Act. Although the court did not expressly decline to follow English law, various propositions in the judgment mark the beginning of a distinct Singaporean jurisprudence on the meaning of the insolvency tests. This article explains the old law, which is poorly understood due to a lack of discussion, and examines the extent to which that has been altered by BNP.