This case note reviews the Court of Appeal decision in BOI v BOJ on whether lottery winnings can be divided as a matrimonial asset upon dissolution of marriage, and if so, how they should be allocated between the former spouses.

Since its incarnation in Wrotham Park Estate , the precise conceptual foundation and contours of negotiating damages have over the years remained somewhat obscure. Following the lead of the UK Supreme Court in One Step , the Herculean tasks of furnishing a sound theoretical rationalisation for and delineating the boundaries of negotiating damages were undertaken by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Turf Club . This note unpacks the Singapore case, places it in comparative context, and investigates the extent to which its judicial treatment on negotiating damages has departed from the doctrinal route prescribed by its English counterpart. From a comparative law perspective, the juxtaposition of Turf Club alongside One Step also helpfully illustrates the level of intellectual and analytical rigour that is exemplary for any jurisdiction aspiring to build up an autochthonous legal system.

Service out of jurisdiction is generally permitted only in two situations. First, under the High Court's international criminal jurisdiction, criminal process can be served out only if the affected foreign state consents. Second, under its international civil jurisdiction, civil process can be served out only if some statutory provision interpreted in accordance with a doctrine of 'subject-matter jurisdiction' allows it. However, in Li Shengwu v Attorney-General , the Court of Appeal allowed service out of process for scandalising contempt of court, but did not rely, and indeed could not have relied, on either its international criminal or civil jurisdiction to do so. Instead, it could only have allowed such service out by relying on a novel third basis of international jurisdiction, derived from Article 93 of the Constitution —in other words, its international constitutional jurisdiction.

Understanding the depth of financial regulations without losing the big picture has presented many challenges to practitioners, businesspersons, and naturally, students. On the one hand, the modern financial market is complex and has multiple dimensions. Traditionally, it has been divided into three major sectors: capital markets, banking, and insurance. Such divisions still underline financial regulations in many countries. Each sector has its own characteristics and practices, and an expert in one sector may not know the details of the other sectors. At the same time, different financial sectors and market participants interact and intersect, contributing to the market's complexity. Beyond the domestic market, there is an international dimension. The rise of international soft law and transnational regulatory networks that issue regulatory standards (eg, the Basel Accord issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) adds another layer of complexity to the financial market. Understanding the overall financial market is a daunting task.

In 1871, Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School, published what is held to be the first casebook in the common law world— A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (1871). It should come as no surprise that, more than a century later, books that combine legal materials with analysis and commentary are still an invaluable part of legal education. The number of relevant cases in any given area only increases with time, and therefore books that harvest, organise and analyse the sheer bulk of relevant legal material are perhaps more needed than ever.

The project which gave rise to this book was motivated by a dearth of existing scholarship on the role of plurality within (as opposed to among ) Southeast Asian nations (at p 5); how plurality can serve as a "source of constitutional dynamism" rather than of "constitutional contestations" (at p 6); and the role of constitutional practice (as opposed to the features which institutions possess on paper) (at p 6). The book aims to address these gaps through a collection of essays, each of which focuses on the constitutional orders in one or two Southeast Asian countries. As the editors Jaclyn L Neo and Bui Ngoc Son recognise, the diversity of experiences and constitutional responses is such that "there is no single model of pluralist constitutions in Southeast Asia" (at p 15). After all, the nature and effects of pluralism depend on the extent of division of a society and the types of plurality (at p 10). Moreover, because pluralism itself is 'dynamic' in the sense that "a pluralist constitution should be able to reconsider new constitutional claims and modify its existing settlement to address them" (at pp 12-13), drawing comparisons is not straightforward because of changes within each country over time. Yet, the book does a good job of presenting the complexities of each country's constitutional order; and, as the editors point out in their useful introduction, interesting patterns and contrasts emerge when the various essays are placed side by side (at pp 15-18). The result is a study that is more than the sum of its parts.

The author of this treatise holds the positions of Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Sydney, General Editor of the Journal of Contract Law and Consultant to Herbert Smith Freehills. Earlier versions of Emeritus Professor Carter's treatise on breach of contract (previously published in 1984 and 1991, and substantially reworked and retitled as a 2012 first edition with Hart Publishing) have taken their place in the canon of leading works focusing primarily on this topic (other recent additions include John Stannard and David Capper, Termination for Breach of Contract (2014) and Neil Andrews, Malcolm Clarke, Andrew Tettenborn and Graham Virgo, Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and Remedies (rev 2017)).

This paper intends to contribute to the debate concerning the foundation and place of non-compensatory damages as a class of remedy applicable to contract law. It pursues this objective based on the theory that non-compensatory damages serve in modern contract law to incentivise and promote the creation of knowledge-based public goods through contracts. Connected with this argument is the view that the settled acceptance of non-compensatory damages in contracts can help in the deployment of contracts to supplement intellectual property ("IP") law regimes in the creation of knowledge-based public goods. The postulations of this article are, chiefly, as follows: a) contract law remedies must respond to contemporary transactional hazards thrown up by the intangible economy; and, b) contracts can be assets per se when they border on critical social interests.

In BOM v BOK , the Singapore Court of Appeal settled a three-pronged test for unconscionable transactions: (1) plaintiff "infirmity", (2) defendant "exploitation" of plaintiff infirmity, and (3) evidential burden on defendant to show the challenged transaction to be "fair, just and reasonable". This formulation is intended to represent a "middle-ground" doctrine of unconscionability, in the sense that it is broader than the original "narrow doctrine" of unconscionability from such cases as Fry v Lane and Cresswell v Potter in England, but "much narrower" than the "broad doctrine" of unconscionability in such cases as Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio in Australia. The Court rejected for Singapore the so-called "broad doctrine" on the ground that it is too unruly to function as a legal doctrine. To the extent that the Court saw the Amadio formulation as representing the spurned "broad doctrine", this article is an attempt to defend that formulation against a charge of hopeless uncertainty. In significant respects, it is argued, the Court's "middle-ground" doctrine is itself potentially broader than the Amadio-style approach to unconscionability.

Despite more than ten years since Competition Law was first introduced in Singapore, a clear consensus on its underlying objectives remains elusive. In this article, we put forth a normative case for why Singapore's competition authorities should prioritise the promotion of economic welfare, as opposed to a more pluralistic approach that pursues competing objectives of equal standing. We argue that the normative bases for many of the rules in EU Competition Law are inconsistent with Singapore's Competition regime, and that such rules are not suitable for direct importation into Singapore. In particular, we illustrate how an overt reliance on EU case law as persuasive authority has resulted in a "formalistic" approach to Competition Law, where presumptions of law allow competition authorities to infer liability upon proof of certain conduct. Henceforth, we suggest that competition authorities in Singapore should exercise considerable caution in their application of EU law in individual cases.