Just over twenty years ago, Singapore became a global leader in legislating for e-commerce. At that time, not only was it the case that books on Information and Communications Technology ("ICT") Law, or Internet Law, or the like, did not exist, there was also a view that books on such a niche area of law would be unhelpful. As Judge Frank Easterbrook famously contended in "Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse" (1996), a course on the 'Law of Cyberspace' would be as misconceived and unilluminating as a course on 'The Law of the Horse'. What Easterbrook said about courses on cyber law would no doubt apply in the same way to books on that subject. Yet, Easterbrook's reservations notwithstanding, courses on ICT Law have proliferated; books on ICT Law have proliferated; and, this book by Warren Chik and Saw Cheng Lim, in which the authors offer readers their expert commentary on ICT Law in Singapore, is another valuable addition to the literature of cyberlaw.

Constitutional Change in Singapore: Reforming the Elected Presidency is an excellent contribution to the literature on a uniquely Singaporean institution: the Elected Presidency. Established in 1991 as a means of providing an intra-institutional check upon the exercise of executive power through a democratically-elected head-of-state, the Elected Presidency is an autochthonous innovation to the traditional Westminster structure of government. A compilation of insightful and thought-provoking essays, the book will be an invaluable resource for lawyers, academics, law students, and anyone else interested in the Elected Presidency.

In Parkin v Thorold (1852) 16 Beav 59, Lord Romilly MR held that Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases between that which is matter of substance and that which is matter of form; and if it find that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and thereby defeat the substance" (at pp 66-67). The distinction between form and substance is long-standing and is familiar to both Chancery and Common Law judges. In contract law, Bingham LJ (as he then was) had warned in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433 (CA) that a court must be alive in identifying a "disguised penalty clause" which would be unenforceable at common law (at 439). With the apparent obsession of 'substance over form', does 'form' still have a role to play in private law? The collection of essays in this volume explores the interactions and influences of both camps within the law of obligations. Broadly speaking, the essays can be sorted into three clusters.

How central is private international law to the resolution of international disputes today? This fundamental question has at least two distinct dimensions. First, there is the question of the extent to which classic private international law's techniques and processes continue to be viable in a world with increasingly diverse yet interconnected legal systems, which challenges the very foundations of the discipline itself. Second, there is the question of whether private international law should extend itself beyond its traditional domain of private law, to address larger concerns of global governance and regulation, which concerns the appropriate location of the discipline's frontiers. In Private International Law: Contemporary Challenges and Continuing Relevance , Franco Ferrari and Diego P Fernández Arroyo bring to bear on these important questions a carefully-curated set of responses from veteran scholars in the field. The resulting collection contains fascinating insights, both for academics and practitioners, on this complex field's current state-of-play.

Major information intermediaries (such as Amazon, Facebook and Google) have considerable control over the flow of information online. This has been an issue of concern for some competition regulators. The concern, generally speaking, is that an information intermediary can use its control over information in anti-competitive ways. This gives rise to the question of how competition law should intervene in this context.

Technological innovations have brought significant changes to the financial sector, such as the ways we make investments and choose insurance plans. But the use of technology has given rise to new risks, and poses challenges to our existing legal framework. In certain cases, regulatory intervention is needed to protect the interests of investors, to guard against new risks. In other cases, however, either no further action is needed because the current legal framework can accommodate the innovations, or regulation might not be desirable as it could impede the development of technology. We must ensure that innovation is not stifled by regulation without compromising the interests of consumers. To understand how such a balance should be struck, the Centre for Banking & Finance Law of the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore organized a conference on 27 and 28 September 2019 on “Alternative Investments in the Tech Era". This issue, which arose from the conference, has lined up a series of articles that shed light on the changes and risks brought about by technology, and put forth suggestions regarding appropriate responses.

This article explores some of the changes that the 4th Industrial Revolution brings to our understanding of money. Our analysis does not suggest that the only valid form of money is that provided or backed by the state.We rather argue that it is unlikely that money-like means of payment will prove sustainable in the long-term if not perceived as being vested with some form of legality. Still, mere legality will not prove to be sufficient for the new payment instruments to qualify as money. They must also prove to be able to serve as means of exchange/payment. A sharp reduction in value will diminish the credibility of the payment promise and thus user confidence/trust. Like acceptance of payment on sight, the use of money as a common measure of value is one of the most important properties of fiat (and metallic) money. Retention of value in times of stress is fundamental as regards the new assets' ability to act as a measure of value and its ability to fit with common perceptions of money. The requisite enquiry should be based on empirical studies of the intertemporal behaviour of the instrument. We suggest that fiat money aside, instruments that could eventually qualify as “money" ought to pass the dual test of legality and relative retention of value. This approach does not suggest a return to the metallic rule, which would limit free circulation of money. It is rather a pragmatic reformulation of the characteristics that means of payment, which do not enjoy the backing (will) of the state, must exhibit to enjoy quasi-money or money-like status. Assets that display high volatility are, thus, unlikely to fulfil the functions of “money" and should instead be dealt under the law of investments if they qualify as such.

Fintech is now defined by a long-term, global process of digitisation of finance, increasingly combined with datafication and new technologies including cloud computing, blockchain, Big Data and artificial intelligence. Cybersecurity and technological risks are thus evolving into major threats to financial stability and national security. This trend has been magnified by the COVID-19 crisis which has heightened dependence on digital technologies and seen substantial parts of the population working from home through systems of questionable security. Additionally, the entry of BigTech firms brings two new issues. The first arises with new forms of potentially systemically important infrastructure. The second arises because data—like finance—benefits from economies of scope and scale and from network effects and—even more than finance—tends towards monopolistic or oligopolistic outcomes. This leads to potential systematic risk from new forms of "Too Big to Fail" and "Too Connected to Fail" phenomena. We suggest some basic principles about how to address this entire range of risks.

Blockchain technology is the cornerstone of FinTech. Blockchains offer the infrastructure for online platforms which store information and digital assets. Distributed ledgers are about to be employed everywhere. Regulators have opted for a regulatory sandbox approach which demonstrates the need for efficient private law rules to fill potential lacunae. This paper identifies the crucial parameters for ascertaining the private law foundations of blockchain technology and its applications. Aspects of contract and property laws will be assessed in order to determine whether digital assets are capable of acquiring erga omnes status. This will include a survey of current blockchain statutes and potential negative externalities of a blockchain which might trigger liability of its members.

The term "data trust" has recently come into circulation to denote some kind of legal governance structure for the management of data, in particular digital databases, but there is much uncertainty and confusion about what a data trust is supposed to be, legally speaking. This paper examines the nature of data as a possible trust asset, and concludes that the traditional trust, the historical creation of English Equity jurisprudence and now found around the world, is a perfectly sensible vehicle for the management of data, in particular the management of combined datasets for both private and charitable purposes, especially educational purposes. The paper also considers the data protection issues that arise in relation to data trusts.