The common law rule that requires certainty in the terminus of leasehold estates has been the subject of trenchant criticism even as it has been upheld repeatedly by the courts. In Berrisford v. Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd [2011] 3W.L.R 1091, the English Supreme Court has once again upheld the rule but has suggested that its harshness may be empered by two different techniques. This note studies the viability of these techniques in Singapore and questions if the rule may be too severely criticised.

The Court of Appeal in the recent case ofWee Siew Bock laid down the legal proposition that "a dominant owner has no proprietary interest in the [servient] land". This, it is respectfully submitted, raises doubts as to the true nature of an easement. This particular proposition is unfortunate as it will be demonstrated that an easement is indeed a proprietary interest in the servient land.

Corporate structures across different jurisdictions are frequently utilised for commercial, profit-making purposes. Notwithstanding this common underpinning, there is undeniably "real" (John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "What is Corporate Law?" in The Anatomy of Corporate Law—A Comparative and Functional Approach (2009) at p. 1 [Armour]) divergence in the jurisdiction-specific corporate laws that govern them. And diversity is necessary fodder for comparative scholarship, a diversity that this book nabashedly celebrates. The book presents case studies on how the derivative action operates in seven selected Asian jurisdictions. In addition, the editors author three overview chapters which attempt to draw the diverse threads together to present a coherent whole. As editors Puchniak, Baum and Ewing-Chow explain in their preface, a project which began as a quest for similarities revealed an "inconvenient truth" and that is that there is no single "grand theory" that unites the operation of the derivative action across the chosen Asian jurisdictions (at p. 90). Instead, how the derivative action functions in the different jurisdictions profiled can be accurately understood only if the multiplicity of local factors in each jurisdiction is duly considered and analysed. However, the book is itself necessarily predicated on a legal convergence, albeit admittedly a broad one - a convergence that is manifested in the governance strategy adopted by the corporate laws of the different jurisdictions: the conferment of a litigation decision right on minority shareholders. Indeed, comparative studies in corporate laware often informed by the "impressive" (Armour at p. 1) underlying uniformity of the corporate form, and the laws that govern it. As Armour, ansmann and Kraakman observed, "[b]usiness corporations have a fundamentally similar set of legal characteristics - and face a fundamentally similar set of legal problems - in all jurisdictions" (Armour at p. 1). The derivative action is one such common response to a common corporate law problem.

There are a number of ways to writing a law book. One is the traditional 'black letter' approach, by providing information on what the current rules and principles of law are and how to use those rules and principles to solve legal problems. This approach assumes that legal issues are by and large separate and distinct from normal everyday activity. However, law is essentially a socio-political institution. For corporate law, there is an added dimension of economic considerations. Therefore, it is no longer sufficient for authors writing on an applied area of law to produce a purely expository text without considering its non-legal context. Iain MacNeil's book is one of such books that provide more than just the legal principles and regulatory rules relevant to financial investment. He also tries to draw from other disciplines relevant theories and principles in order to introduce an element of critical awareness and assessment into the areas considered.

Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative Perspective is based on a research project of the same title. In its Preface, the Editor Jens Sherpe writes: "[I]t was apparent that the legal position on marital agreements in England and Wales contrasted starkly with that of the continental European jurisdictions, which seemed to merit a comparative study". Indeed, in recent years, the legal status of marital agreements in England and Wales has been criticised and debated on. The courts in the U.K. have a wide discretion over the determination of the financial consequences of a divorce, and marital agreements made between spouses over such matters are not enforceable in themselves. In contrast, many of the continental European jurisdictions have more definite default matrimonial property regimes and also permit marital agreements to be enforced. The topic was made part of the Law Commission of England andWales' Tenth Programme of Law Reform.

This article attempts a critical examination of the limitation period for a fatal accident claim brought for lost support by the dependants of a deceased person under the Civil Law Act 1956 of Malaysia.It aims to demonstrate that the said limitation period has caused, or is capable of causing, harsh and unfair results to litigants in Malaysia and that reform of the law is clearly necessary. Throughout the article, reference is made to the corresponding statutory provisions in the Civil Law Act of Singapore and where relevant, the proposals that have been made for reform in Singapore.

This article examines the role of contributory negligence in claims for assault and battery in the light of several cases which have considered the issue, including, in particular, a recent decision of the English Court of Appeal. It considers the injustice to which the current English law might give rise, and suggests alternative approaches to assault and battery cases in which claimants are partly responsible for the harm they suffer.

Charity law is an area of law in Singapore of which, sadly, little is known. This lack of knowledge has also led to the proliferation of a number of misconceptions. This article looks at four misconceptions, namely the legal structure of charities, the relationship between charities and Institutions of a Public Character, the definition of 'charitable purposes' in Singapore and the interplay between the registration requirements and the provisions on fund-raising appeals under the Charities Act. The article seeks to debunk these misconceptions by providing a clearer understanding of the legal position of charities in Singapore. This has valuable implications for reform of charity law, which is of growing importance and interest in Singapore.

The Charity Commission of England and Wales is granted powers under the Charities Act 2011 of decision-making about charitable status and public benefit of entities which were formerly the province of the judiciary. Considering that the incursion of government into charity law has become such a controversial issue, it is remarkable that the intermingling of administrative and judicial power in the Charities Act 2011 has received so little attention. This article explores the constitutional challenges faced by charity law in the UK and reveals what lessons may be learned by Australia and Hong Kong as each jurisdiction prepares to introduce a charity commission. In particular, the article contends that complications concerning the operation of the doctrine of separation of powers remain unresolved in England and Wales and that both Australia and Hong Kong need to give the judiciary a formidable role in adjudication of charitable status, so that the charity commission of each jurisdiction, although an arm of the executive, can be checked in crucial cases.

Just as in the Indian Penal Code, the intoxication provisions contained in ss. 85 and 86 of the Singaporean and Malaysian Penal Codes are described as 'General Exceptions', suggesting that they operate as affirmative (or 'supervening') substantive-law defences to criminal liability. It is argued in this article, however, that the primary function of these provisions is not to create a distinct legal defence. Rather, it is to enable the courts to convict persons who do not satisfy the mens rea requirements of a crime, when their lack of mens rea is because of intoxication. The sections permit us to treat such defendants as having mens rea when in fact they do not. As such, the provisions are mainly inculpatory, not exculpatory. They assist the prosecution, not the defendant. This claim will be defended both in principle and in terms of statutory interpretation. This article also discusses certain exceptions, where intoxication does operate as a true supervening defence.