There is much recent debate on the scope of legal advice privilege that is available to a corporation. A major source of controversies is the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Three Rivers D.C. v. Bank of England (No. 5). This article addresses two particularly difficult questions. First, when is a communication made between the lawyer acting for a corporation and an employee or officer of the corporation privileged? Secondly, under what circumstances, if any, would the privilege apply to a document prepared by an employee or officer for the purpose of enabling the corporation to obtain legal advice? An attempt is made to find answers to these problems within the terms of the Evidence Act. Lessons will be drawn from the law of England, Australia and the United States.

Agency costs have become one of the significant issues in the protection of minority shareholders particularly in controlled companies. The obvious advantage of a controlling shareholder lies in the fact that the controlling shareholder's interest is aligned to that of the non-controlling shareholder. However the concern with controlled companies is that there may be "private benefits of control" which is usually taken to mean as including everything controlling shareholders are able to get out of their position without minority shareholders receiving a proportionate share. There is persistent danger that controlling shareholders will transfer company's resources to themselves. This article will deliberate the reasons why we need to extend protection to minority shareholders. The article will then examine the nature and extent of the agency problems faced by minority shareholders in controlled public companies in Malaysia. The article will achieve this objective by discussing the various strategies available to overcome agency costs arising from the relationship of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The article will also discuss the application of the strategies to overcome agency problems in Malaysia. The article will conclude that to entrench a culture of sound corporate governance in Malaysia requires more than just changes to laws and regulations, it requires the introduction of a self-enforcing model.

HongKong has faced tremendous transitions as the United Kingdom and China negotiated its political future which culminated in China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in July 1997. Whilst massive human rights violations in Hong Kong have not materialised after 1997, the autonomy as has repeatedly been promised to the people of Hong Kong by the British and Chinese governments has been eroded. We will assess whether Hong Kong is entitled to the right of self-determination under international law and, if so, what the right entails and whether and how it has been violated or implemented. We will then discuss how the ultimate aim of universal suffrage in Hong Kong continues to be diluted. Finally, we will examine the constitutional implications of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress' power and use of interpretation of a law that is meant to be the ultimate law of Hong Kong.

The Indonesian, Singaporean and Canadian States define or describe themselves as multicultural. Since law is part of one's culture, a state's multiculturalism should lead that state to recognise a multiplicity of laws, to recognise one form or another of legal pluralism. Singapore and Indonesia practice legal pluralism by granting state recognition to laws other than state law. Canada however does not really do so. The author questions Canada's commitment to multiculturalism in law.

The oft-repeated idea of Sharia as a code of law, and thereby rigid and inflexible, reflects a concept of law arguably with a provenance stemming from the 18th and 19th centuries during the period of European colonization in Muslim lands. With the advent of European-style laws, legal institutions, and legal curricula, Shariawas reduced to an abstract body of doctrines disconnected from a historical or institutional context. This concept of Sharia has transformed its significance: no longer a rule of law tradition, it is often used to provide (over)determinate anchors in contests over political identity. As liberal societies grapple to find a place for religious communities such as Muslims, this paper suggests that governments and private parties cooperate to develop a Muslim civil society sector that facilitates debate within the religious community, and between the government and the religious community. Civil society can be used to empower competing voices within the Muslim community, undermine conceptions of religious absolutism, and foster a mutual accommodation between religious commitment and national values.

This paper analyzes the role of multiculturalism in the exercise of administrative discretion. Whether the setting is national security or social welfare eligibility, standards of justice rise or fall on the judgments of individual "front-line" decision-makers. Such decision-makers are the human face of the state. Against this contextual backdrop, this paper addresses a series of critical questions, including: To what extent is the exercise of discretion specifically, and the character of the administrative state more generally, determined by culture and identity? Will decision-makers in a representative public service treat members of their own communities differently than members of other communities? Administrative culture and culture of the society at large are deeply entangled in the exercise of discretion. The reasons for discretionary decisions, in other words, must grapple with and not sidestep the values, beliefs and administrative structures which underlie them. This approach is elaborated in the Canadian context, with particular emphasis on the policy of the federal government to achieve a multicultural public service and the development of impartiality and fairness standards in Canadian administrative law.