Typically, inter-religious conflict posed the main threat to racial and religious harmony in Singapore. In 2009, 'soft constitutional law' norms ordering the distinct but overlapping spheres of 'religion' and 'politics' were extended to a newly emergent public order threat to social harmony. This arises where groups advocating religiously-informed values clash with groups advocating liberalhumanistic values to shape legal policy. The 'AWARE controversy' exemplified such 'culture wars'. A non-government organisation leadership tussle became a public order threat when non-religious parties invoked the spectre of religious activism to agitate other religious and secular groups; this episode received presidential and ministerial attention in major policy speeches, reiterating the rules of engagement between religion and politics in a secular democracy. These informal norms are analysed to ascertain the legitimate role of religion in the public sphere as exercises of religious liberty, and what constitutes a religious 'threat' to public order within the constitutional framework.

Constitutional texts are products of conscious deliberation, although Westminster-based Constitutions are not exhaustive. This article examines whether there are implied rights in the Singapore Constitution, given express ministerial statements affirming the constitutional status of an implied right to vote. It evaluates the debates concerning the legal status of voting rights and explores the possible theoretical bases which may ground an interpretive method supporting the 'declaration' of implied fundamental rights, the legitimacy and nature of constitutional implications. Attention is paid to Australian experience in the judicial derivation of an implied right to freedom of political communication in considering methods of constitutional implications. It considers whether it is beneficial and desirable to have an express constitutional right to vote, what its content might be and reflects on the Singapore model of representative democracy and citizenship.

The doctrine of consideration has come under increasing attack. In Gay Choon Ing v. Loh Sze Ti Terence Peter, Andrew Phang Boon Leong J.A. of the Singapore Court of Appeal raises the spectre of its replacement with the doctrines of economic duress, undue influence, unconscionability and promissory estoppel. In response to the reasoning of Phang J.A. and others, I argue that: (i) consideration is not a meaningless doctrine; in particular, the adequacy of consideration is relevant to the enforceability of an agreement and 'practical benefit' can be made a meaningful concept; (ii) contract law does not, and should not, enforce all seriously intended undertakings; and (iii) the vitiating factors do not simply interrogate the presence of contractual intention and cannot replace the functions performed by consideration.

English Contract Law has long struggled to understand the effect of a fundamental common mistake in contract formation. Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. [1932] A.C. 161 recognises that a common mistake which totally undermines a contract renders it void. Solle v. Butcher [1950] 1 K.B. 671 recognises a doctrine of 'mistake in equity' under which a serious common mistake in contract formation falling short of totally undermining the contract could give an adversely affected party the right to rescind the contract. This article accepts that the enormous difficulty in differentiating these two kinds of mistake justifies the insistence by the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace [2003] Q.B. 679 that there can be only one doctrine of common mistake. However, the article proceeds to argue that where the risk of the commonly mistaken matter is not allocated by the contract itself a better doctrine would be that the contract is voidable.

This article discusses the need for greater certainty of subject-matter in developing guiding principles in intellectual property rights. It begins by noting the importance of certainty of subject-matter in property law in general and argues that certainty as to the scope of what is protected by intellectual property law is no less important especially with the strengthening of the rights conferred (particularly in copyright). It examines briefly the need for certainty of subject-matter in the context of registered trade marks and patent law before moving into a discussion of copyright and in particular the position of names and titles. It argues for greater caution in the use of competition driven mantra such as "reaping where you have not sown" in developing property based rights and for copyright lawto make conscious attempts to apply with greater clarity and rigour the expression/idea or facts dichotomy.

The concept of 'distinctiveness' in the Singapore Trade Marks Act 1999 plays a very important role as gate-keeper of what should be entered unto the trade mark register. For this reason, there must be proper understanding of how the statutory provisions on distinctiveness work. The aim of this article is to unravel the knots in these provisions, and to propose a construction of these provisions that furthers the policy underlying the distinctiveness requirement - namely, publici juris.

Singapore's broadly-worded general anti-avoidance rule ("GAAR") borrowed heavily from the antitax avoidance provisions of Australia and New Zealand. It was Parliament's intention that local courts be guided by the case law of these jurisdictions in interpreting and applying the GAAR. This article discusses the different approaches that the judiciary in these two countries had adopted in interpreting and applying their respective anti-avoidance provisions, and suggests that this divergence could be attributed to a fundamental difference in the level of importance accorded to the Duke of Westminster principle. It is unclear from the Singapore High Court decision of UOL Development (Novena) Pte. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Stamp Duty whether one approach is to be preferred over the other. This article argues that it is imperative to bear in mind the reason behind the different approaches of both Australian and New Zealand courts in charting the course for a local GAAR jurisprudence.

Whilst mortgagees do not owe mortgagors any general duty of care, they may come under specific duties of care, such as the duty to take reasonable steps to obtain the market price when they exercise their power of sale. This is trite law in Singapore. However, it has recently been suggested that mortgagees ought to owe mortgagors a general duty of care whenever there is no conflict of interest between them. This would effectively impose upon mortgagees a duty of care in deciding whether and when to sell the mortgaged asset. This article supports the status quo on grounds of precedent, principle and policy. The case for a general duty of care is flawed. This article argues that no general duty of care ought to be imposed on mortgagees; in particular, mortgagees should owe mortgagors no duty of care in deciding whether and when to sell.

Parties on the losing side in international arbitration have long argued that an error of law is a defence to the enforcement of foreign awards. Citing article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, such parties have argued that a manifest error of law is a violation of public policy. While national courts have generally paid little heed to this line of argument, this article seeks to raise the possibility that there may yet be the exceedingly rare instance in which a court should preclude enforcing an award marred by a hideous error of law. Limited review of an arbitrator's application of the law in international arbitrations should exist where enforcing the award would be contrary to the forum's most basic notions of justice. By way of case law, natural justice and general principles of arbitral law, this article argues that if indeed such egregious awards arise, they should be denied enforcement under the Convention.

This article deals with the traditional conception of purchase of a conforming tender of documents under a negotiation letter of credit and the extent to which that understanding has evolved in the courts in recent years to meet the changing needs of bankers involved in credit operations. In particular, it provides a thorough analysis of the conventional view of negotiation as the purchase of complying presentation by a nominated bank. Along the way it tackles thorny problems involving a nominated banks's promise to pay upon receipt of funds from the issuing bank; the legal nature and effect of the banks's discounted payment of the amount of a credit after having been advised by the issuing bank that the documents are complying; the question of ascertaining the conformity of a negotiation with the negotiation period stipulated in a credit; and finally the vexed issue of what amounts to good faith purchase by a nominated bank.