Viewed as a remedy, the function of the constructive trust is not to render superfluous, but to reflect and enforce, the principles of the law of equity. Thus it is that there is no place in the law of this country for the notion of 'a constructive trust of a new model' which 'by whatever name it is described ... is ... Imposed by law whenever justice and good conscience requires it.' Under the law of this country - as, I venture to think, under the present law of England - proprietary rights fall to be governed by principles of law and not by some mix of judicial discretion, subjective views about 'which party ought to win' and 'the formless void of individual moral opinion.' Long before Lord Seldon's anachronism identifying the Chancellor's foot and the measure of Chancery relief, undefined notions of 'justice' and what was 'fair' had given way in the law of equity to the rule of ordered principle which is of the essence of any coherent system of rational law.

This article compares the M'Naghten Rules and some of the principal variations found in the Commonwealth of Nations for the purpose of formulating the best possible provision on the defence of insanity. The discussion is enhanced by evaluations of the concept of diminished responsibility operating in the Commonwealth, and of the provision on insanity in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The utility of invoking international law to inform the crafting of public law arguments depends on the receptivity of a domestic legal system towards international law. There is in Singapore case law a discernible shift in the judicial approach towards handling international legal arguments, from a clumsy dismissal to a more sophisticated handling of how, in particular, human rights law may influence domestic rights adjudication. This article uses the 2008 case of Re Gavin Millar Q.C. as a springboard to consider how and if the approach of Singapore courts towards receiving and applying human rights norms in public law cases has changed. It discusses the creeping influence of international human rights norms, such as those embodied in the UDHR, in national courts and what this signifies in terms of developing a human rights culture in the thinking and operation of legal actors, such as the bench and bar.

This article examines the provisions of the U.K. and Singapore Limitation Acts with respect to actions in tort. It focuses in particular on the judicial discretion to disregard the relevant limitation period in personal injury cases which is available under the U.K. legislation, but not its Singapore counterpart. Discussing recent cases from both jurisdictions in which this discretion (or the lack thereof) has been at issue, this article goes on to consider the adverse consequences which might result from Singapore's more rigid approach to the limitation of actions, particularly in cases of sexual abuse.

In some circumstances, common law or equitable rules may allow the presence of an initial duty owed by A to B to have an effect on a third party, C. This is the case, for example, where C is under a duty not to procure a breach by A of a contractual duty owed by A to B; it is also the case where A's initial duty gives B an "equitable property right". Such cases may seem to call into question the fundamental distinction between personal rights and property rights. Nonetheless, this article argues that we can account for the common law and equitable methods by which an initial duty is allowed to affect a third party whilst preserving that fundamental distinction. To do so, we need to recognise one other category of rights (here called "persistent rights") and a sub-division of personal rights (here called "protected personal rights").

The article is concerned with the application of trusts law in disputes between home-sharers who are cohabitants in England and Wales. It considers the criticisms made of trusts law in dealing with such disputes, and the proposals of the Law Commission for England and Wales in its 2007 Cohabitation Report. However, as plans to introduce any new legislation have been shelved by the British government, cohabitants must continue to rely on trusts law. In the light of these developments, the aim of the article is to critique Equity's response in disputes over the shared home and, more particularly, whether the remedial approach evinced in recent cases will enable trusts law to respond in a fairer manner in these disputes. The article will, however, argue that trusts law remains gender biased because of its continued emphasis on financial contributions, and will thus discriminate disproportionately against female cohabitants.

A rare parliamentary petition which sought the repeal of section 377A of the Penal Code that criminalises acts of gross indecency between male adults, was presented and debated in Parliament in October 2007. This article critically examines the constitutional law dimension and issues in relation to the 377A debate in Singapore. It highlights the primary jurisprudential thrust of the competing arguments and assumptions. It advances and defends the communitarian case for preserving 377A which the author argues is both normatively desirable and empirically reflective of existing Singapore law and policy. With particular regard to the Singapore context, it reflects on how democratic societies should address questions of law and profound moral disagreement, the importance of civil debate, and whether the legislative or judicial forum is most appropriate for making decisions on morally controversial questions.