When a contract for the sale of real property is entered into, what happens if, between the time of contract and completion, an official announcement is published for the compulsory acquisition of that property? The traditional view has been based largely on one English High Court Case, Hillingdon Estates Co Ltd v Stonefield Estates Co Ltd, which held that compulsory acquisition in such circumstances did not affect the purchaser's obligation to complete the purchase. That view was rejected by the Singapore Court of appeal in Lim Kim Som v Sherifa Taibah bte Abdul Rahman, which declared such a contract frustrated. However, the Privy Council has now expressly approved the reasoning in Hillingdon's case in E Johnson (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd. This paper analyses the three decisions and the developments in local case law after Lim Kim Sim's case, and suggests how the courts may proceed to deal with this question in future.

The term "incurred" plays a fundamental role in the operation of the deduction provision in section 14(1) of the Income Tax Act. However, its meaning has yet to be judicially examined in any depth by the Singaporean courts. There is however, a significant body of Australian Jurisprudence on the meaning of this expression. This article examines the Australian pronouncements on this concept and comments on their potential persuasive value in Singapore.

The crucial role that examination of witnesses plays in the determination of the weight of oral evidence in criminal proceedings has traditionally been hampered by excessive application of the hearsay rule and the rule against narrative, both of which to a greater or lesser extent, preclude access by the trier of fact to previous statements of the witness being examined which may shed valuable light on the veracity of his testimony in court. This article defends the law in Singapore permitting more liberal reliance on a witness's previous statements and argues that the liberalisation in the law can be taken further. The relevance of probabilistic reasoning in weight determination is also discussed and the article argues that probabilistic reasoning in weight determination should not be conflated with probabilistic reasoning in the determination of the standard of proof of guilt.

In the current race towards the staking of claims in the new life sciences, some of the most important and fundamental legal and ethical questions relating to rights and property in the human body, organs, tissue and other human by-products remain unanswered. This paper explores the current approach of the common law to the question of rights to the human body and human body tissue or organs. Relevant existing statutory provisions in Singapore are also examined. Is it possible to assert a legal right to property in the human body at common law? Is there a distinction between organs and tissues obtained from cadavers, and from that which is obtained from living donors? What is or should be the proper balance of rights between tissue donors, commercial concerns and end users? What is the proper object of public policy in relation to the protection of individual dignity and the encouragement of biotechnological advances? In section I of this article, the underlying assumptions of the common law are examined. In section 2, the impact of the absence of clear law in this area is explored in the context of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry case. In section 3, the dimension of consent to the taking of human tissue is explored, and its relevance to claims to rights to retention, and of property. In section 4, relevant Singapore statutory provisions are examined. In section 5, the rights of living donors in the common law are considered. Section 6 deals with living donors and their rights under the statutory law.

It is easy to think of the corroboration rules as a thing of the past – something which in a few years will no longer plague the law of evidence. Yet we must not forget the apparently intractable problem which they were designed to deal with – that of oath against oath, one person's word against another. Both historically and presently, the law has had to struggle with a choice between a regime of rules or a system of discretion; and the result is a fascinating compound of rule and discretion.

This article deals with the ambit of the scope of the term 'common gaming house', found in section 2 of the Common Gaming Houses Act (Cap 49, 1985 Rev Ed). The ambit of the term is important, as many activities are made an offence by the Act only if they occur on premises that are deemed by the Act to be a 'common gaming house'.

On an objective interpretation of section 300(c) of the Penal Code, an offender may be convicted of murder, and the death penalty imposed, if he or she intentionally inflicts even a minor injury, which happens to cause death. This article defends the view that the objective approach is indefensible both legally and theoretically, and offers in its place a qualified subjective approach, which imposes liability under section 300(c) only where the offender intends to inflict what is subjectively known to be a serious injury that might possibly cause death.

This essay examines Finnis' theory of natural law by addressing Finnis' solution to the problem of justification that besets any theory of law. It assesses the quality of Finnis' theory from its purported justification of self-evidence, and by asking if Finnis' theory adds anything of value to classical natural law discourse, the scholarship of which he purports to develop.