It has been a decade since the Singapore Court of Appeal in AJU v AJT adopted a minimal review approach for an arbitral tribunal's findings, even for findings that have an impact on a public policy issue such as corruption. This paper traces the jurisprudence in this area: from the authorities leading up to AJU v AJT , through to the Privy Council's decision in Betamax which cited AJU v AJT . Through this tracing exercise, this paper seeks to clarify the precise ambit of the minimal review approach under AJU v AJT , and argues that the minimal review approach continues to strike the correct balance between the competing public policy concerns of finality in arbitration and the countervailing public policy concerns that find expression in the public policy ground of challenge against arbitral awards.

The Court of Appeal in Syed Suhail v AG (2020) recently clarified in 2020 that the 'intentional and arbitrary discrimination test' was an example of how article 12(1), the equality guarantee, could be breached in relation to executive action, but was not itself the threshold test for breach, as it was considered not to accord sufficient protection where fundamental liberties are concerned. A two-limb approach was articulated, to assess the permissibility of differential treatment which first asked whether A and B were similarly situated and if so, whether legitimate reasons exist to justify this. It was underscored that the constitutional test in this respect not be conflated with ordinary administrative law grounds of challenge, such as relevancy or rationality review. This article focuses on two key questions: firstly, whether a distinctively constitutionally based ground for challenging executive action which contravenes article 12(1) has been developed and if not, whether traditional judicial review principles, understood as importing variable degrees of scrutiny depending on the nature of the power and gravity of interest implicated, may provide the degree of 'searching scrutiny' required for fundamental rights cases. Secondly, it explores the idea of 'legitimate legal expectations' generated by article 12(1), introduced by the court, as distinct from substantive legitimate expectations. It draws on developments in English public law, such as the principle of consistency and 'most anxious scrutiny' where rights are concerned, and reflects on how these ideas might add to the normative storehouse of public law governance in Singapore.

The tax system in Hong Kong is often presented as a model for efficiency in terms of tax compliance and administration. The design features of the tax system contributed to the jurisdiction's status as a preferred hub for international investment, but the equity impact of the system in terms of Hong Kong residents has scarcely been examined. The article analyses how tax exclusions, concessions and preferential rates have benefited the wealthy more than the poor and have prevented the income tax system from playing a role in mitigating the striking disparity in income distribution in the jurisdiction comparable to the role it plays in Hong Kong's developed counterparts. The lessons from Hong Kong offer a striking example of the extent to which tax law design can impact on equity and social stability. In a world of growing income inequality, any effort to make a tax system more equitable is worth serious consideration.

Constitutional law scholars in Singapore often wait for years in eager anticipation of a landmark decision from the Court of Appeal concerning the ambit of fundamental rights guaranteed in the Singapore Constitution . Unlike other areas of law, for instance tort law, there have been few such iconic decisions over the last couple of decades. On 8 October 2021, in The Online Citizen v The Attorney-General , a five-member full bench of the Singapore Court of Appeal, handed down a joint unanimous decision on whether the correction directions issued by the Minister of Home Affairs against allegedly false statements of fact under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 impermissibly restricted freedom of speech under Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution and were unconstitutional.

The Singapore Court of Appeal has for the first time in The Online Citizen v The Attorney-General (8 October 2021) adjudicated on the constitutionality of correction directions issued by Ministers against allegedly false statements of fact under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 . An overarching framework was utilised to assess whether the Ministerial directions restrict free speech under Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution ; if so, whether the restrictions are justifiable under the Constitution and whether there is a rational nexus between the statutory aims and enumerated exceptions. This case comment also examines the constitutional stance towards subject statements, the doctrine of compelled speech as applied in the US and UK, stop communication directions, the contexts in which statements are interpreted and their potential harms as well as the proportionality analysis for assessing the constitutionality of legislation.

In Online Citizen , the Court of Appeal's first judgment on appeal under Section 17 of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act , the Court addressed the constitutionality of POFMA 's provisions empowering the Minister to issue Correction Directions under Article 14 of the Constitution. The decision is the first application of the three-step framework set out in Jolovan Wham for Article 14 challenges, but the Court's reasoning therein appears to differ quite considerably from that earlier decision, both on how courts should identify restrictions on free speech under Article 14(1) and how courts should assess justifications given for those restrictions under Article 14(2). This note unpacks the Court's reasoning on the Article 14 challenge in Online Citizen , drawing out the implications that it may have for future challenges and constitutional adjudication more broadly.

The new civil procedure rules for the General Division of the High Court in Singapore, excluding the Singapore International Commercial Court—the Rules of Court 2021 —were gazetted on 1 December 2021, and will come into operation on 1 April 2022. This article examines the impact of the new civil justice regime on the Singapore courts' approach to assuming jurisdiction over foreign-based defendants (the "service-out jurisdiction"). Prior to its publication, it had been anticipated that ROC 2021 would significantly alter the manner in which the service-out jurisdiction would be asserted. However, as this article highlights, under ROC 2021 , and the accompanying Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, the courts' overall approach to exercising jurisdiction over defendants outside Singapore is destined to remain largely unaltered. In general terms, this outcome is to be welcomed, as it avoids the conceptual and practical problems that would have arisen had some of the more far-reaching reforms proposed when drafting ROC 2021 been, in fact, implemented.

The appropriate test for identifying a restraint of trade has long troubled the courts. In Peninsula Securities Ltd v Dunnes Stores , the United Kingdom ("UK") Supreme Court overruled a decision of the House of Lords that had stood for more than fifty years and adopted the 'trading society' test which had been put forward in a minority judgment of the House of Lords decision. Not long after this notable development, in Quantum Actuarial v Quantum Advisory , the English Court of Appeal found that the trading society test was not comprehensive as it could not apply to novel or unique provisions. The trading society test is also open to criticism for being vague and unhelpful. It is, however, supported here for its broad perspective, flexibility and synergy with the competing policies at stake: freedom to contract and freedom to trade.

In VTL v VTM [2021] SGHCF 30 (" VTL v VTM "), the Singapore High Court had the opportunity to consider the application of the rarely-invoked mutual wills doctrine. The court gave effect to the mutual wills by holding that a subsequent will was invalid and revoking the grant of probate that had been obtained by the executors of that subsequent will. The court in so doing departed from the orthodox understanding that a mutual will takes effect by imposing a constructive trust over the relevant property, rather than by rendering a subsequent will invalid. This comment reviews the law on mutual wills in Singapore and elsewhere, and suggests that VTL v VTM was a missed opportunity to unpack some of the thorny issues that have yet to be resolved in relation to the doctrine.

In Charles Lim v Hong Choon Hau [2021] SGCA 43, the Singapore Court of Appeal delivered an important judgment on no-oral-variation clauses, and their legal effect. This note analyses the reasoning of the Court, addressing also some implications the case might have on future developments.