This article constitutes a general introduction to this special feature on anti-terrorism legislation, consisting of nine contributions covering developments in Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. It identifies six main themes covered in these contributions: the apparent overbreadth and redundancy of the legislation; the suppression of the financing of terrorists; various criminal law problems, such as the lack of adequate mens rea components; tensions between anti-terrorism measures, including internal security legislation, and constitutional safeguards; the concentration of powers in the executive; and the relationship between domestic and international law.

This article examines the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act enacted in the United Kingdom in response to the September 11 attacks in the United States last year. The article first identifies the critical framework of the discussion by analysing the reactive quality of the debate on terrorism and questioning the effectiveness of anti-terrorist legislation. The article then considers the concept of terrorism under UK law, before turning to a more specific discussion of the Act, particularly in three areas: tracking terrorist finance, detention and identification of suspected offenders and security measures. Finally, Part IX of the article also provides a European dimension in its discussion on some European Union anti-terrorist initiatives.

Singapore's legal system has always made provision for dealing with terrorism directed at Singapore - this is its historical heritage. The centre-piece is the Internal Security Act which confers the power of indefinite detention without trial. Singapore was traditionally indifferent towards terrorism targeted outside of Singapore. This stemmed from the principle of territoriality. Things changed with the enactment of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism) Regulations 2001 - a legislation which creates extra-territorial crimes for the funding and assisting of terrorist activities outside of Singapore. This discussion considers and compares both the old and the new.

This article seeks to illuminate the history of the Internal Security Act and its uses against terrorism and political opposition in Malaysia. Recent applications of the ISA and developments in judicial review are highlighted, revealing the disturbing implications of September 11 on human rights in the country.

Treaty obligations, including any obligation imposed by the Security Council under the United Nations Charter, are not automatically a part of Singapore law. In response to September 11, Singapore was therefore required to devise a flexible legal mechanism by which further and better domestic legal standards could be set in a timely fashion should the Security Council so require. The United Nations Act is that mechanism. A principal difficulty is that, in its drafting language, the Act is not confined to Security Council decisions to combat terrorism. Instead, whenever the Security Council of the United Nations calls upon the Government to apply any measure to give effect to any decision of the Council taken under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, the Minister may, if he considers it necessary or expedient, issue regulations under the Act in order to apply those measures. In addition, Article 41 in itself is a potentially far-reaching provision. It authorises any measure short of armed force which the Council may consider appropriate in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Act therefore raises domestic questions about the extent and scope of the Minister's powers, about whether the courts may review the Minister's decisions, and if so what standard(s) of review may be applied by the courts. At common law in Singapore, even where the Minister characterises his decision as one involving "national security", that characterisation may be challenged on grounds of legal irrationality. Furthermore, on the proper construction of this Act, the Minister's decisions, it would seem, must also be based on the existence, and proper construction, of a binding Security Council obligation. Yet whether a Security Council resolution imposes binding legal obligations can sometimes present "mixed" legal and foreign policy questions. This may be reason enough for the courts in Singapore to exercise restraint when called upon to review the Minister's decisions taken under the Act.

This article describes and analyses the two main pieces of legislation with which South Africa has responded to the phenomena of organised crime and terrorism, namely, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act and the draft Anti-Terrorism Bill. It identifies the main features of each and focuses on the elements which may be unconstitutional. It argues that the rights infringements in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act might, on the whole, be accepted as justifiable by the courts, but that those in the Anti-Terrorism Bill, in its current form, will probably not pass constitutional muster. A closing section compares the general severity of the anti terrorism and anti-organised crime measures with the measures required by the international regime, and concludes that they are substantially similar. In light of the fact that the legislature and executive may possibly be obliged to adopt the extreme approach taken in the legislation, the article concludes with a brief examination of the resulting conflicts between international and domestic law and between the different branches of government.